Development and History
Development and Economic History
Members of the Development and Economic History Research Group combine archival data, lab-in-the-field experiments, randomized controlled trials, text analysis, survey and secondary data along with theoretical tools to study issues in development and economic history. Faculty and students work in the field in South Asia, China and Africa as well as doing archival work in libraries across Europe and Asia.
Almost all faculty are members of CAGE in the economics department and some are also members of Warwick Interdisciplinary Centre for International Development (WICID). There is a regular weekly external seminar, two weekly internal workshops, and high quality research students. We also organise international conferences on campus, or in Venice.
Our activities
Development and Economic History Research Group Workshop/Seminar
Monday: 1.00-2.00pm
For faculty and PhD students at Warwick and other top-level academic institutions across the world. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below.
Organisers: Bishnupriya Gupta and Claudia Rei
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Development and Economic History Research Group are:
Research Students
Events
CAGE-AMES Workshop - Mausumi Das (Delhi School of Economics)
Mausumi Das (visiting Associate Professor, Delhi School of Economics) will be presenting at the CAGE AMES Seminar on 23rd October.
Title: Corruption, Culture and Comparative Development
Abstract: Agents in an economy differ in terms of their moral attitude towards corruption. Attitudes are culturally acquired and influence agents' occupational choice, which in turn impacts growth. In a heterogeneous agents framework, we explore this interaction between corruption, culture and the level of economic activities. We show that relationship between high-moral attitude and economic growth could be non-monotonic. Presence of many high moral agents helps in reducing the overall degree of corruption. At the same time, for any given level of corruption, high moral agents are less adaptable to game an already corrupt system in pursuit of economic profits. Thus the initial cultural composition of the population interacts with economic incentives to generate differential growth paths for different economies. Moreover the cultural composition of the population changes endogenously responding to economic growth, which creates possibilities of multiple balanced growth paths and culture-induced poverty traps.