Development and History
Development and Economic History
Members of the Development and Economic History Research Group combine archival data, lab-in-the-field experiments, randomized controlled trials, text analysis, survey and secondary data along with theoretical tools to study issues in development and economic history. Faculty and students work in the field in South Asia, China and Africa as well as doing archival work in libraries across Europe and Asia.
Almost all faculty are members of CAGE in the economics department and some are also members of Warwick Interdisciplinary Centre for International Development (WICID). There is a regular weekly external seminar, two weekly internal workshops, and high quality research students. We also organise international conferences on campus, or in Venice.
Our activities
Development and Economic History Research Group Workshop/Seminar
Monday: 1.00-2.00pm
For faculty and PhD students at Warwick and other top-level academic institutions across the world. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below.
Organisers: Bishnupriya Gupta and Claudia Rei
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Development and Economic History Research Group are:
Bishnupriya Gupta
Co-ordinator
Anant Sudarshan
Deputy Co-ordinator
Research Students
Events
Wed 8 May, '24- |
CAGE-AMES Workshop - Adam Di Lizia (PGR)S2.79Title: Social Influence in Online Reviews: Evidence from the Steam Store Abstract: How good are reviews as signals of product quality for consumers? Using a data-set derived from the popular Steam gaming platform I investigate the ‘priming’ of quality judgements as based on pre-existing consumer assessments. A policy reform on Steam in 2019 changed the average level of exposure to previous consumer quality ratings, with this randomly occurring within a game and reviewer’s life cycle. I find that removing the exposure of a reviewer to a product’s average rating leads to a 35% drop in the dependency of their review on such a rating. This is not driven by selection effects, and is robust to a wide range of alternate specifications and measures. The effect is heavily asymmetric: negativity compounds to inflate the gap between poorly-rated and well rated games. This is driven by users who are less experienced both within and across games. Finally, using estimates of owner data, I run a simple structural model of game choice based on rating. A 1% increase to product rating is equivalent to a 2.5 dollar sale price reduction, suggesting this effect has large implications for buyers and sellers.
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Wed 5 Jun, '24- |
CAGE-AMES Workshop - to be advisedS0.09Title to be advised. |