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CAGE Chatham House Series

Incentives to Produce Race-related Research

748/2025 Arun Advani, Elliott Ash, Anton Boltachka, David Cai, Imran Rasul

An established literature has studied potential biases in the economics publication process based on traits of authors. We complement such work by studying whether the subject matter of study relates to publication outcomes. We do so in the context of race-related research: work that studies economic well-being across racial/ethnic groups. We investigate the implicit career incentives economists have to work on such topics by examining paths to publication for a corpus of 22,056 NBER working papers (WPs) posted from 1974 to 2015. We use an algorithm to classify whether a given WP studies race-related issues. We then construct paths to publication from WPs to data on published articles, and compare paths for race-related WPs to various counterfactual sets of WPs. We document that unconditionally, race-related NBER WPs are less likely to be published in any journal, in an economics journal, and more likely to publish in lower tier economics journals. Once we condition on observable characteristics including field and author affiliations, differences in paths to publication largely disappear, and such work is actually slightly more likely to publish in top-tier economics journals. Consistent with unconditional differences in paths to publication being salient to researchers, we find evidence of ex ante selection into WPs studying race-related issues in that they are of higher readability than other WPs. To understand the interplay with selection of researchers, we compare results to paths to publications for 10,306 CEPR WPs posted from 1984 to 2015. We conclude by discussing implications for economists’ incentives to contribute to debates on race and ethnicity in the economy.

Race-related Research in Economics

685/2025 Arun Advani, Elliott Ash, Anton Boltachka, David Cai, Imran Rasul

Issues of racial justice and economic inequalities between racial and ethnic groups have risen to the top of public debate. Economists’ ability to contribute to these debates is based on the body of race-related research. We study the volume and content of race-related research in economics. We base our analysis on a corpus of 225,000 economics publications from 1960 to 2020 to which we apply an algorithmic approach to classify race-related work. We present three new facts. First, since 1960 less than 2% of economics publications have been race-related. There is an uptick in such work in the mid 1990s. Among the top-5 journals this is driven by the American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Political Economy. Econometrica and the Review of Economic Studies have each cumulatively published fewer than 15 race-related articles since 1960. Second, on content, while over 50% of race-related publications in the 1970s focused on Black individuals, by the 2010s this had fallen to 20%. There has been a steady decline in the share of race-related research on discrimination since the 1980s, with a rise in the share of studies on identity. Finally, we apply our algorithm to NBER and CEPR working papers posted over the last four decades, to study an earlier stage of the research process. We document a balkanization of race-related research into a few fields, and its continued absence from many others – a result that holds even within the subset of research examining issues of inequality or diversity. We discuss implications of our findings for economists’ ability to contribute to debates on race and ethnicity in the economy.

To the Depths of the Sunk Cost: Experiments Revisiting the Elusive Effect

746/2025 George Beknazar-Yuzbashev, Sota Ichiba, Mateusz Stalinski

Despite being often discussed both in practice and academic circles, the sunk cost effect remains empirically elusive. Our model based on reference point dependence suggests that the traditional way of testing it—by assigning discounts—may not produce the desired effect. Motivated by this, we evaluate it across the gain-loss divide in two pre-registered experiments. In an online study, we randomize the price (low, medium, or high) of a ticket to enter a real-effort task and observe its effect on play time. Despite varying the sunk cost by $2 for a 14-minute task and the sample size of N=1,806, we detect only a small effect (0.09 SD or 1.1 minutes). We further explore the economic applications of the effect in a field experiment on YouTube with N=11,328 videos in which we randomize whether the time until a pre-video ad becomes skippable is shortened (0 s), default (5 s), or extended (10 s). The intervention has an overall insignificant effect on video engagement. This is driven by a sizable negative effect on the extensive margin, a channel which is not present in the online study. Specifically, more users leave before the video starts in the extended treatment (5.2 pp. or 28% more relative to the shortened treatment). Taking the results of both studies together, we offer a cautionary tale that applying even the most intuitive behavioral effects in policy settings can prove challenging.

Perceived Social Acceptance and Migrants’ Financial Inclusion

745/2025 Giorgia Barboni, Nicolás de Roux, Santiago Perez-Cardona

We conducted a telephonic survey experiment with 2,115 Venezuelan migrants to examine how their perceptions of Colombian’s social acceptance influence their engagement with the financial system. We find that 66% of the subjects we interviewed underestimate the extent to which natives are open towards migrants. We then show that providing accurate information reduces belief errors by 23 percentage points. This correction increases migrants’ willingness to interact with the financial system. In particular, individuals who initially underestimated Colombian’s acceptance of migrants are 15% more likely to visit a bank and request financial information in the next two months relative to the control group. These individuals also show a 12% increase in the willingness to open a digital wallet and an 18% increase in the willingness to open a savings account. These effects are concentrated among individuals who have not experienced episodes of discrimination in Colombia. We find no effects on the willingness to apply for a loan or an insurance product, consistent with the idea that supply barriers play a significant role for the financial inclusion of vulnerable populations. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we show that the increased willingness to engage with the financial system is driven by belief updating. In a short follow-up survey six months later, we find that belief corrections persist over time, and while we are underpowered to detect significant behavioral effects, the patterns remain consistent with the baseline results. Our findings highlight that misperceptions about native’s social acceptance of migrants can drive self-exclusion from the financial system.

Politics of Food: An Experiment on Trust in Expert Regulation and Economic Costs of Political Polarization

744/2025 Christopher Burnitt, Jared Gars, Mateusz Stalinski

Addressing rising political polarization has become a focal point for policy makers. Yet, there is little evidence of its economic impacts, especially in contexts where partisanship cannot be easily hidden. To fill this gap, we study a novel channel: the perception of out-group partisan oversight of independent civil service reduces trust in regulation, affecting key markets (e.g., food and medicine). First, we motivate it by demonstrating the salience of the association between the president and expert regulators in US media reporting. Second, in a pre-registered experiment with 5,566 individuals, we test the channel by exploiting an alignment in the way that the EPA under Trump and Biden defended the safety of spraying citrus crops with antibiotics. This enabled us to randomize the partisanship of the administration, holding the scientific arguments constant. Despite the EPA’s independence, out-group administration reduces support for the spraying by 26%, lowers trust in the EPA’s evaluation, and increases donations to an NGO opposing the spraying by 15%. We find no overall effect on the willing- ness to pay for citrus products, measured in an obfuscated follow-up survey. However, we document significant differences in effects for elastic vs. inelastic consumers. Taken together, polarization has the potential to affect economic decisions. However, a reduction in trust might not translate into lower demand, especially for inelastic consumers.

The Impact of World War II Army Service on Income and Mobility in the 1960s by Ethnoracial Group

742/2025 Sergio E. Barrera, Andreas Ferrara, Price V. Fishback, Misty L. Heggeness

We link the 1940 full-count Census to World War II enlistment records and 1969 administrative tax returns to study how WWII service in the Army and Army Airforce impacted the income and mobility of non-Hispanic White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American male Army veterans relative to their non-Army counterparts in 1969. The size of our data set provides enough power to shed new light on previously understudied groups, such as Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. In comparisons of Army veterans with non-Army men, Ordinary Least Squares estimates suggest that WWII Army veterans had higher incomes than non-Army men within the same group, and Army veterans were less likely to change counties between 1940 and 1969 than non-Army men within the non-Hispanic White, Black, and Hispanic groups. Worries about selection bias led us to estimate the effects with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that compares men who were just too young to serve during World War II to men who were just old enough to serve. Those results showed that Army veterans had lower adjusted gross incomes than non-Army men within the non-Hispanic White, Black, and Asian groups, and slightly higher incomes within the Hispanic and Native American groups. The differences varied by type of income. Migration across county boundaries was lower for Army veterans than non-Army men among non-Hispanic Whites, Asians, and Native Americans, and there were only small differences among Blacks and Hispanics.

The impact of the energy price crisis on GB consumers: a difference-in-difference experiment

727/2024 Victor Ajayi, Andrew Burlinson, Monica Giulietti, and Michael Waterson

In April 2022, consumers in Great Britain (GB) witnessed a 54% increase in the energy price cap, as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, which sent wholesale gas prices spiralling across Europe. We leverage high-frequency data collected by the Smart Energy Research Lab, a representative panel containing daily gas and electricity data for around 13,000 households in Great Britain between January 2021 and December 2023 to investigate the implications. We exploit several datasets linked to the panel data which include time-varying and cross-sectional information. We rely on two price shocks: 1) in October 2021 a wave of energy retail suppliers leaving the industry. At this time over two million consumers on fixed contracts were forced to join a new supplier and pay a variable tariff, and 2) these consumers were exposed to a second price shock caused by the Ukraine-Russia conflict which fed through April 2022’s energy price cap. Exploiting this pseudo-natural experiment, we use a difference-in-difference framework to estimate average treatment effects on this group of consumers and find that they would have consumed an additional 10 percentage points more electricity and 16 percentage points more gas had their prices remained fixed. These estimates are robust to a battery of robustness checks and point towards a significant loss in welfare for consumers on variable tariffs in the early stages of the energy price crisis

Informational Boundaries of the State

697/2024 Thiemo Fetzer, Callum Shaw, Jacob Edenhofer

Formal conceptions of state capacity have mostly focused on indirect measures of state capacity – by, for instance, using the state’s fiscal or extractive capacity as a proxy for its overall capacity. Yet, this input or extractive view of state capacity falls short, especially since cross-country empirical evidence suggests that similar levels of fiscal capacity, measured by tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, can produce starkly different outputs – both in classic economic terms and in broader terms that citizens would recognize as desirable outcomes, including quality of life, health, security, equality of opportunity, and intergenerational mobility. This paper argues that a central step towards addressing these shortcomings of the conventional view is to account for a crucial and largely ignored boundary of the state or dimension of state capacity: its capacity to gather, process, and deploy information in its conduct of fiscal policy. Specifically, we study how the presence or lack of such informational capacity constrains governments in responding to crises, such as the recent energy price shock. Our framework provides the analytical toolkit to examine how the informational boundary of the state shapes the incentives for policymakers to resort to untargeted and/or distortionary policy instruments, as opposed to targeted and non-distortionary ones, in responding to crises. The policy response to the energy crisis following the invasion of Ukraine provides the empirical context upon which we bring this theoretical framework to bear on data, though the latter can be straightforwardly extended to other recent crises.

Wars and the Labor Market Outcomes of Minorities in the U.S.

687/2023 Andreas Ferrara

This chapter reviews key literature studying the effects of wars on minority and underrepresented groups in U.S. labor markets in the 20th century. These labor markets, characterized by historically pervasive barriers to entry into certain occupations and industries, promotions, and fair pay for underrepresented workers, experienced severe challenges during times of war. These challenges served to break down some of the barriers faced by underrepresented workers. Recent years have shown that sudden labor shortages, similar to those induced by large-scale wars, are not a feature of the past. Hence, a better understanding of such shortages and their effects on different groups continues to be important, especially since opportunities and equality in the labor market are closely intertwined with political, legal, and socioeconomic equality. The focus here is on the labor market outcomes of Black and white women, as well as Black men, during and after the two World Wars. Their labor inputs compensated for the lack of white male workers during the war years; however, only WWII generated significant and more prolonged socioeconomic progress for both groups. This chapter summarizes theoretical considerations that can explain why some war-induced labor market shocks are persistent while others are not, as well as the empirical literature related to the labor market experiences of women and Black workers during and after the World Wars.

Epidemics and pandemics: from the Justinianic Plague to the Spanish Flu

682/2023 Guido Alfani

This article provides an overview of current knowledge about the economic consequences of major epidemics and pandemics in the long run of history, from the Justinianic Plague of the 540s to the Spanish Flu of 1918-19. For the preindustrial period, the analysis concentrates on plagues (and particularly on the Black Death pandemic of the fourteenth century and on the last great European plagues of the seventeenth), which stand out in the comparison with other epidemics both because of their outsized economic and demographic effects, and for having concentrated the attention of economic historians and other social scientists. For the industrial period, cholera is taken as the main pandemic threat of the nineteenth century. The article concludes analyzing the Spanish Flu, which made the world aware of the danger posed by the influenza viruses - and which is arguably the best term of comparison with the recent Covid-19 pandemic, due to some epidemiological similarities. The article illustrates the short, medium and long-run consequences of the various epidemics and pandemics discussed, and also highlights the importance of the historical context in mediating the impact of any epidemic, against tendencies to generalize from some well-known, but possibly exceptional, cases such as the Black Death. This and other findings teach us some useful lessons for understanding better recent pandemics, like Covid-19, and might help to build preparedness against future threats of a similar kind.

British Economic Growth and Development

658/2023 Stephen Broadberry

British per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 0.13 per cent between 1086 and 1700. Although the annual growth rate increased to 0.48 per cent between 1700 and 1870, the period covering the Industrial Revolution, this was still not particularly fast. What mattered for Britain’s catching-up and forging ahead of other economies was its resilience, with few episodes of negative growth. By the late nineteenth century, other countries had begun to emulate Britain’s Industrial Revolution and by the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had emerged as the new per capita income leader. However, the process by which the United States and Germany overtook Britain owed more to a later structural shift out of agriculture and developments within services than to any change in the comparative productivity position within manufacturing. After 1870, other countries were bound to grow faster than Britain while catching-up, and once Britain had fallen behind, it too could benefit from borrowing technology and institutions from abroad. TFP growth has been an important proximate source of Britain’s rise to GDP per capita leadership and also of Britain’s relative economic decline since 1870. However, the ultimate source of these developments in technology lies in the institutional framework. Britain’s rise to GDP per capita leadership occurred as innovators responded to the factor price combination that they faced within an environment shaped by the Enlightenment. After 1870, British relative decline occurred as barriers to competition arose and slowed the response to technological change.

Slavery and the British Industrial Revolution

656/2023 Stephan Heblich, Stephen J. Redding, Hans-Joachim Voth

Did overseas slave-holding by Britons accelerate the Industrial Revolution? We provide theory and evidence on the contribution of slave wealth to Britain’s growth prior to 1835. We compare areas of Britain with high and low exposure to the colonial plantation economy, using granular data on wealth from compensation records. Before the major expansion of slave holding from the 1640s onwards, both types of area exhibited similar levels of economic activity. However, by the 1830s, slavery wealth is strongly correlated with economic development – slave-holding areas are less agricultural, closer to cotton mills, and have higher property wealth. We rationalize these findings using a dynamic spatial model, where slavery investment raises the return to capital accumulation, expanding production in capital-intensive sectors. To establish causality, we use arguably exogenous variation in slave mortality on the passage from Africa to the Indies, driven by weather shocks. We show that weather shocks influenced the continued involvement of ancestors in the slave trade; weather-induced slave mortality of slave-trading ancestors in each area is strongly predictive of slaveholding in 1833. Quantifying our model using the observed data, we find that Britain would have been substantially poorer and more agricultural in the absence of overseas slave wealth. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that slavery wealth accelerated Britain’s industrial revolution.

Regulatory barriers to climate action: evidence from conservation areas in England

654/2023 Thiemo Fetzer

Preserving heritage is an important part of maintaining collective identity for future generations. Yet, in the context of the climate crisis, it is imperative to understand to what extent there is a tangible trade-off between conserving “character” vis-a-vis averting the worst of climate change – a much more existential threat to those future generations. Studying data for more than half of the English housing stock, I show that conservation area status – a special area-based designation to preserve the unique character of a neighborhood – not to be confused with preservation of historic buildings – in England may be responsible for up to 3.2 million tons of avoidable CO2 emissions annually. Using a suite of micro-econometric methods and alternative identification strategies ranging from saturated specifications, border discontinuity, matching estimation and an instrumental variables approach leveraging World War II wartime destruction in London – I show that properties in conservation areas have a notable worse energy efficiency; experience lower investment in retrofitting and consume notably higher levels of energy owing to poor energy efficiency. Effect sizes are very consistent comparing engineering based energy consumption estimates with actual consumption data. Effects can be directly attributed to planning requirements for otherwise permitted development that only apply to properties by virtue of them being located inside a conservation area.

Catching-up and falling behind : Russian economic growth,1690s-1880s

626/2022 Stephen Broadberry & Elena Korchmina

This paper provides decadal estimates of GDP per capita for the Russian Empire from the 1690s to the 1880s. GDP per capita in the 1880s was barely 3 per cent higher than in the 1690s, but this was not the result of continuous stagnation. Rather, positive growth during the first half of the eighteenth century was followed by negative growth between the 1760s and 1800s and stagnation from the 1800s to the 1880s. The main driver of this variation in GDP per capita was the relationship between population and land, with land per capita increasing to the 1760s, then declining to the 1800s and staying stable during the nineteenth century. This suggests that serfdom may not have been as strong a barrier to eighteenth century growth as has often been suggested, nor its abolition in 1861 as significant for subsequent growth. Although large-scale industry grew more rapidly than the rest of the economy, particularly after Peter the Great’s reforms in the early eighteenth century, this had only a minor effect on the economy as a whole, as it was starting from a very low base and still only accounted for 10 per cent of GDP by the 1880s. Russian economic growth before the 1760s resulted in catching-up on northwest Europe, but this was followed by a period of relative decline, leaving mid-nineteenth century Russia further behind than at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Natural disasters and local government finance: Evidence from typhoon Haiyan

620/2022 Joseph Capuno, Jose Corpuz and Samuel Lordemus

This paper examines how natural disasters affect low public finances and their interplay with intergovernmental transfers and external resources. We document the causal effect of a natural disaster on the allocation of local public resources the local government fiscal dynamics by exploiting the random nature of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, one of the most devastating natural disasters in recent history. Combining data on local government finance with reports on the level of damages caused by the typhoon, we employ several estimation strategies: we first rely on difference-in-differences and event study designs, and we further address a potential endogeneity concern by instrumenting the intensity exposure to the typhoon with distance to the storm path. We show that local revenue and public expenditures remain largely unaffected, except debt service, which are on average 15% lower in affected cities or municipalities. However, we document important heterogeneity in local revenue responses. We find no support for the moral hazard problem: our results indicate that external aid leads to higher local expenditures, particularly general public services, socioeconomic expenditures, including education and social services, and debt payments. These results highlight the crucial role of central government transfers in supporting local governments and mitigating the geographical economic disparities in the aftermath of exogenous shocks such as natural disasters.

The distribution of the gender wage gap: An equilibrium model

614/2022 Sonia R. Bhalotra, Manuel Fernández and Fan Wang

We develop an equilibrium model of the labor market to investigate the joint evolution of gender gaps in labor force participation and wages. We do this overall and by task-based occupation and skill, which allows us to study distributional effects. We structurally estimate the model using data from Mexico over a period during which women’s participation increased by fifty percent. We provide new evidence that male and female labor are closer substitutes in high-paying analytical task-intensive occupations than in lower-paying manual and routine task-intensive occupations. We find that demand trends favored women, especially college-educated women. Consistent with these results, we see a widening of the gender wage gap at the lower end of the distribution, alongside a narrowing at the top. We derive own and cross-occupation wage elasticities of labor supply varying with skill, gender and time, and our counterfactual estimates demonstrate that ignoring the countervailing effects of equilibrium wage adjustments on labor supplies, as is commonly done in the literature, can be misleading. We find that increased appliance availability was the key driver of increases in the participation of unskilled women, and fertility decline a key driver for skilled women. The growth of appliances acted to widen the gender wage gap and the decline of fertility to narrow it. We also trace equilibrium impacts of growth in college attainment, which was more rapid among women, and of emigration, which was dominated by unskilled men.

Gifted children programs’ short and long-term impact: Higher Education, earnings, and the knowledge economy

609/2022 Victor Lavy

We estimate the short-run and longer-term effects of gifted children programs (GCP) in high schools in Israel. The program tracks the most talented students into gifted children classes, starting 10th grade. They receive more resources in smaller classes, a unique curriculum, access to high-quality teachers, and courses in universities. We use test scores in exams that measure cognitive achievements or intelligence and ability, measured in different ages, to select a comparison group of equally gifted students from other cities where GCP was not offered at the time. Based on administrative data, we follow 22 cohorts of GCP participants who graduated high school in 1992-2013. We measure treatment effects on outcomes, ranging from high school to the labour market in their 30s and 40s. Remarkably, the results we obtain do not vary when using alternative measures of ability or in the age, they are assessed. The evidence on the impact of GCP on academic achievements in high school is mixed, some compulsory subjects are affected negatively, and fewer are affected positively. However, these estimates are very small, implying a tiny effect size. These results stand in contrast to the abundance of educational resources enjoyed by GCP participants, in addition to better peers in terms of SES background and outcomes. We discuss in this context the objective of the program to widen the scope and area of interest of its participants beyond the regular curriculum. We also highlight the potential adverse effect of the Big-Fish-Little-Pond Effect. In the longer run, we find meaningful positive effects of GCP on higher education attainment. All gifted children achieve a BA degree, but a much higher share of GCP participants graduate with a double major. The effect of getting a Ph.D. is also positive, driven by more Ph.D. degrees in Elite Universities. GCP participants study more math, computer, and physical sciences but engage less in engineering programs. The net effect on STEM degrees is, therefore, zero. However, a much higher share of GCP participants graduated with two STEM majors. This evidence, along with the significant effect on a double major, suggests that GCP enhances the impact of “multipotentiality,” which characterizes many gifted adolescents. We find no effect of GCP on employment and earnings. Nor do we find that they work more than other equally talented children in the various sectors of the knowledge economy: hi-tech manufacturing, hi-tech services, and academic institutions. Finally, we examine marriage and family formation patterns as mediating effects and find no discerned GCP effects.

Disguising prejudice: Popular rationales as excuses for intolerant expression

555/2021 Leonardo Bursztyn, Ingar Haaland, Aakaash Rao and Chris Roth

We study how popular rationales enable public anti-minority actions. Rationales to oppose minorities genuinely persuade some people. But they also provide “excuses” that may reduce the stigma associated with anti-minority expression, thereby increasing anti-minority behaviour. In a first experiment, participants learn that a previous respondent authorized a donation to an anti-immigrant organization and then make an inference about the respondent’s underlying motivations. Participants informed that their matched respondent learned about a study claiming that immigrants increase crime rates before authorizing the donation see the respondent as less intolerant. In a second experiment, participants learn about that same study and then choose whether to authorize a public donation to the anti-immigrant organization. Participants informed that their exposure to the rationale will be publicly observable are substantially more likely to make the donation than participants who are informed that their exposure will remain private. A final experiment shows that people are more willing to post anti-immigrant content on social media when they can use an anti-immigrant video clip from Fox News as an excuse. Our findings suggest that prominent public figures can lower the social cost of intolerant expression by popularizing rationales, increasing anti-minority expression.

A division of laborers: Identity and efficiency in India

540/2021 Guilhem Cassan, Daniel Keniston and Tatyana Kleineberg

Workers’ social identity affects their choice of occupation, and therefore the structure and prosperity of the aggregate economy. We study this phenomenon in a setting where work and identity are particularly intertwined: the Indian caste system. Using a new dataset that combines information on caste, occupation, wages, and historical evidence of subcastes’ traditional occupations, we show that caste members are still greatly overrepresented in their traditional occupations. To quantify the effects of caste-level distortions on aggregate and distributional outcomes, we develop a general equilibrium Roy model of occupational choice. We structurally estimate the model and evaluate counterfactuals in which we remove castes’ ties to their traditional occupations: both through their direct preferences, and also via their parental occupations and social networks. We find that the share of workers employed in their traditional occupation decreases substantially. However, effects on aggregate output and productivity are very small– and in some counterfactuals even negative–because gains from a more efficient human capital allocation are offset by productivity losses from weaker caste networks and reduced learning across generations. Our findings emphasize the importance of caste identity in coordinating workers into occupational networks which enable productivity spillovers.

Health inequality and the 1918 influenza in South Africa

532/2021 Johan Fourie and Jonathan Jayes

The 1918 influenza – the Spanish flu – killed an estimated 6% of South Africans. Not all were equally affected. Mortality rates were particularly high in districts with a large share of black and coloured residents. To investigate why this happened, we transcribed 39,482 death certificates from the Cape Province. Using a novel indicator – whether a doctor’s name appears on the death certificate – we argue that the unequal health outcomes were a consequence of unequal access to healthcare. Our results show that the racial inequalities in health outcomes that existed before October 1918 were exacerbated during the pandemic. Access to healthcare, as we expected, worsened for black and coloured residents of the Cape Province. Unexpectedly, however, we found that other inequalities were unchanged, or even reversed, notably age, occupation and location. Living in the city, for instance, became a health hazard rather than a benefit during the pandemic. These surprising results contradict the general assumption that all forms of inequality are exacerbated during a crisis. Our analyses suggest explanations for the widening racial gap in healthcare access during the 1918 pandemic, from both the demand and the supply side. We could find, however, no evidence of racial prejudice. Our findings confirm the importance of taking race into account in studying the effects of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic or other world crises.

Age-based policy in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic: How common are multigenerational households?

522/2020 Thijs Van Rens and Andrew J. Oswald

Are general lockdowns an appropriate response to the threat of Covid-19? Recent cost-benefit studies do not favour the case for them. Instead, since the virus practises a form of age discrimination (approximately 90% of coronavirus deaths are older than 65), some analysts have suggested an alternative. It is that younger citizens -- the generation worst affected by lockdowns and the one that will predominantly pay the eventual tax bill for furlough -- should be allowed to return to work to sustain the economy. Lockdown advocates argue that this would be dangerous, because older people would get infected by young workers living in the same home. We explore that claim. We find that 96% of UK workers under age 40 do not live with anyone over 65. In fact, 92% of all UK workers live in a household without anyone over 65 years old – and that holds true for white and BAME workers. Releasing young workers would thus expose only a small fraction of older citizens to intra-household transmission, although we recognize that the absolute number of people infected might eventually become considerable, and some vulnerable citizens could potentially be at risk if they live in large households. In general this paper’s results illustrate the potential value of fine-tuning the lifting of restrictions. Our findings buttress the cost-benefit case for age-based policies.

Does Contact Tracing Work? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from an Excel Error in England

521/2020 Thiemo Fetzer and Thomas Graeber

Contact tracing has been a central pillar of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, contact tracing measures face substantive challenges in practice and well-identified evidence about their effectiveness re-mains scarce. This paper exploits quasi-random variation in COVID-19 con-tact tracing. Between September 25 and October 2, 2020, a total of 15,841COVID-19 cases in England (around 15 to 20% of all cases) were not immediately referred to the contact tracing system due to a data processing error. Case information was truncated from an Excel spreadsheet after the row limit had been reached, which was discovered on October 3. There is substantial variation in the degree to which different parts of England areas were exposed– by chance – to delayed referrals of COVID-19 cases to to the contact tracing system. We show that more affected areas subsequently experienced a drastic rise in new COVID-19 infections and deaths alongside an increase in the positivity rate and the number of test performed, as well as a decline in the performance of the contact tracing system. Conservative estimates suggest that the failure of timely contact tracing due to the data glitch is associated with more than 125,000 additional infections and over 1,500 additional COVID-19-related deaths. Our finding provide strong quasi-experimental evidence for the effectiveness of contact tracing.

Epidemics, inequality and poverty in pre-industrial and early industrial times

520/2020 Guido Alfani

Recent research has explored the distributive consequences of major historical epidemics, and the current crisis triggered by Covid-19 prompts us to look at the past for insights about how pandemics can affect inequalities in income, wealth, and health. The fourteenth-century Black Death, which is usually believed to have led to a significant reduction in economic inequality, has attracted the greatest attention. However, the picture becomes much more complex if other epidemics are considered. This article covers the worst epidemics of preindustrial times, from Justinian’s Plague of 540-41 to the last great European plagues of the seventeenth century, as well as the cholera waves of the nineteenth. It shows how the distributive outcomes of lethal epidemics do not only depend upon mortality rates, but are mediated by a range of factors, chief among them the institutional framework in place at the onset of each crisis. It then explores how past epidemics affected poverty, arguing that highly lethal epidemics could reduce its prevalence through two deeply different mechanisms: redistribution towards the poor, or extermination of the poor. It concludes by recalling the historical connection between the progressive weakening and spacing in time of lethal epidemics and improvements in life expectancy, and by discussing how epidemics affected inequality in health and living standards.

Measuring the Regional Economic Cost of Brexit: Evidence up to 2019

486/2020 Thiemo Fetzer and Shizhuo Wang

The United Kingdom (UK) reported record employment levels following its vote to Leave the European Union (EU), leading to many pundits discarding the dire pre-Brexit vote impact assessments as part of “project fear.” This paper studies the cost of the Brexit-vote to date across UK regions finding significant evidence suggesting that the economic costs of the Brexit-vote are both sizeable and far from evenly distributed. Among 382 districts, at least 168 districts appear to be Brexit-vote losers, having lost, on average 8.54 percentage points of output in 2018 compared to their respective synthetic controls. The Brexit-vote costs have increased in districts that: a) supported Leave in 2016; b) have a large manufacturing sector; c) have a large share of low skilled workers. The Brexit- vote induced economic divergence across regions is already exacerbating the regional economic inequalities that the 2016 EU referendum vote made apparent. Indirect evidence further suggests that firms may, amidst the significant (trade) policy uncertainty, have shifted away from capital to labour in the short- term given that Brexit has, to date, not led to changes in market access. The resulting short-term employment- and payroll growth post-2016 is not supported by productivity increases in most parts of the UK. This sets up the possibility for significant labor market adjustments once Brexit becomes a de-facto reality. Further, there is some evidence suggesting that COVID19 may exacerbate the regional economic impact of the Brexit-vote to date.

Religion in Economic History: A Survey

480/2020 Sascha O. Becker, Jared Rubin and Ludger Woessmann

This chapter surveys the recent social science literature on religion in economic history, covering both socioeconomic causes and consequences of religion. Following the rapidly growing literature, it focuses on the three main monotheisms—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—and on the period up to WWII. Works on Judaism address Jewish occupational specialization, human capital, emancipation, and the causes and consequences of Jewish persecution. One set of papers on Christianity studies the role of the Catholic Church in European economic history since the medieval period. Taking advantage of newly digitized data and advanced econometric techniques, the voluminous literature on the Protestant Reformation studies its socioeconomic causes as well as its consequences for human capital, secularization, political change, technology diffusion, and social outcomes. Works on missionaries show that early access to Christian missions still has political, educational, and economic consequences in present-day Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Much of the economics of Islam focuses on the role that Islam and Islamic institutions played in political-economy outcomes and in the “long divergence” between the Middle East and Western Europe. Finally, cross-country analyses seek to understand the broader determinants of religious practice and its various effects across the world. We highlight three general insights that emerge from this literature. First, the monotheistic character of the Abrahamic religions facilitated a close historical interconnection of religion with political power and conflict. Second, human capital often played a leading role in the interconnection between religion and economic history. Third, many socioeconomic factors matter in the historical development of religions.

India's Lockdown: An Interim Report

476/2020 Debraj Ray and S. Subramanian

Our goal is to provide an interim report on the Indian lockdown provoked by the covid19 pandemic. While our main themes — ranging from the philosophy of lockdown to the provision of relief measures — transcend the Indian case, our context is deeply India-specific in several senses that we hope will become clear through the article. A fundamental theme that recurs throughout our writing is the enormous visibility of covid-19 deaths worldwide, now that sensitivities and anxieties regarding the pandemic have been honed to an extreme sharpness. Governments everywhere are propelled to respect this visibility, developing countries perhaps even more so than their developed counterparts. In advanced economies, the cost of achieving this reduction in visible deaths is “merely” a dramatic reduction in overall economic activity, coupled with a farreaching relief package to partly compensate those who bear such losses. But for India, a developing country with great sectoral and occupational vulnerabilities, this dramatic reduction is more than economics: it means lives lost. These lost lives, through violence, starvation, indebtedness and extreme stress, both psychological and physiological, are invisible, in the sense that they are—and will continue to be—diffuse in space, time, cause and category. They will blend into the surrounding landscape; they are not news, though the intrepid statistician or economist will pick them up as the months go by. It is this conjunction of visibility and invisibility that drives the Indian response. The lockdown meets all international standards so far; the relief package none.

Fundamental Utilitarianism and Intergenerational Equity with Extinction Discounting

451/2020 Graciela Chichilnisky, Peter J. Hammond and Nicholas Stern

Ramsey famously condemned discounting "future enjoyments" as "ethically indefensible". Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individuals' utilities. By contrast, Arrow (1999a,b) accepted, perhaps reluctantly, what he called Koopmans' (1960) "strong argument" implying that no equitable preference ordering exists for a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams. Here we derive an equitable utilitarian objective for a finite population based on a version of the Vickrey-Harsanyi original position, where there is an equal probability of becoming each person. Fora potentially infinite population facing an exogenous stochastic process of extinction, an equitable extinction biased original position requires equal conditional probabilities, given that the individual's generation survives the extinction process. Such a position is well-defined if and only if survival probabilities decline fast enough for the expected total number of individuals who can ever live to be finite. Then, provided that each individual's utility is bounded both above and below, maximizing expected "extinction discounted" total utility | as advocated, inter alia, by the Stern Review on climate change - provides a coherent and dynamically consistent equitable objective, even when the population size of each generation can be chosen.

Family standards of living over the long run, England 1280-1850

419/2019 Sara Horrell, Jane Humphries and Jacob Weisdorf

We utilise wage series for men, women and children to construct a long-run measure of family welfare in England, 1280-1850. We make adjustment for the participation rates of women and children, the varying number of days supplied to the labour market over time, the changing involvement of married women in paid work, and the evolving occupational structure of the economy. The resultant series is the first to depict the long run material experience of a representative, working family. Our family existed just above bare bones survival prior to the Black Death, but, as attested elsewhere, shortage of labour after the plague brought substantial gains. However, these gains were not unassailable. Restrictions on women’s work and Tudor turmoil pushed the family below the ‘respectable’ level previously achieved. Transformation of the economy from the mid-1600s onwards coincided with improved welfare. While the position of the representative family tracked the trajectory of GDP per capita through the early modern and industrial revolution periods, this was only achieved by shifting contributions from different family members. Our paper provides an account of long run material wellbeing on a more satisfactory basis than historians have achieved hitherto, not focused on men alone nor on marginalised women and children, but on realistically constructed historical families.

Voting over a distributed ledger: an interdisciplinary perspective

416/2019 Amrita Dhillon, Grammateia Kotsialou, Peter McBurney and Luke Riley

This work discusses the potential of a blockchain based infrastructure for a decentralised online voting platform. When compared to paper based voting, online voting can vastly increase the speed that votes can be counted, expand the overall accessibility of the election system and decrease the cost of turnout. Yet despite these advantages, online voting for political office is subject to fraud at various levels due to its centralised nature. In this paper, we describe a general architecture of a centralised online voting system and detail which areas of such a system are vulnerable to electoral fraud. We then proceed to introduce the key ideas underlying blockchain technology as a decentralised mechanism that can address these problems. We discuss the advantages and weaknesses of the blockchain technology, the protocols the technology uses and what criteria a good blockchain protocol should satisfy (depending on the voting application). We argue that the decentralisation inherent in the blockchain technology could increase the public’s trust in national elections, as well as eliminate voter impersonation and double voting. We conclude with a discussion regarding how economists and social scientists can collaborate with the blockchain community in a research agenda on the design of efficient blockchain protocols and new voting systems such as liquid democracy.

The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits

414/2019 Arun Advani, William Elming and Jonathan Shaw

Understanding causes of and solutions to non-compliance is important for a tax authority. In this paper we study how and why audits affect reported tax in the years after audit - the dynamic effect - for individual income taxpayers. We exploit data from a random audit program covering more than 53,000 income tax self assessment returns in the UK, combined with data on the population of tax filers between 1999 and 2012. We first document that there is substantial non-compliance in this population. One in three filers underreports the tax owed. Third party information on an income source does not predict whether a taxpayer is non-compliant on that income source, though it does predict the extent of underreporting. Using the random nature of the audits, we provide evidence of dynamic effects. Audits raise reported tax liabilities for at least five years after audit, implying an additional yield 1.5 times the direct revenue raised from the audit. The magnitude of the impact falls over time, and this decline is faster for less autocorrelated income sources. Taking an event study approach, we further show that the change in reporting behaviour comes only from those found to have made errors in their tax report. Finally, using an extension of the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model, we show that these results are best explained by audits providing the tax authority with information, which then constrains taxpayers' ability to misreport.

Forced Migration and Human Capital: Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers

374/2018 Sascha O. Becker, Irena Grosfeld, Pauline Grosjean, Nico Voigtländer and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

We exploit a unique historical setting to study the long-run effects of forced migration on investment in education. After World War II, the Polish borders were redrawn, resulting in large-scale migration. Poles were forced to move from the Kresy territories in the East (taken over by the USSR) and were resettled mostly to the newly acquired Western Territories, from which Germans were expelled. We combine historical censuses with newly collected survey data to show that, while there were no pre-WWII differences in education, Poles with a family history of forced migration are significantly more educated today. Descendants of forced migrants have on average one extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher education. This result holds when we restrict ancestral locations to a subsample around the former Kresy border and include fixed effects for the destination of migrants. As Kresy migrants were of the same ethnicity and religion as other Poles, we bypass confounding factors of other cases of forced migration. We show that labor market competition with natives and selection of migrants are also unlikely to drive our results. Survey evidence suggests that forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away from material possessions and towards investment in a mobile asset – human capital. The effects persist over three generations.

Is Envy Harmful to a Society’s Psychological Health and Wellbeing? A Longitudinal Study of 18,000 Adults

361/2018 Redzo Mujcic and Andrew J. Oswald

Nearly 100 years ago, the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell warned of the social dangers of widespread envy. One view of modern society is that it is systematically developing a set of institutions -- such as social media and new forms of advertising -- that make people feel inadequate and envious of others. If so, how might that be influencing the psychological health of our citizens? This paper reports the first large-scale longitudinal research into envy and its possible repercussions. The paper studies 18,000 randomly selected individuals over the years 2005, 2009, and 2013. Using measures of SF-36 mental health and psychological well-being, four main conclusions emerge. First, the young are especially susceptible. Levels of envy fall as people grow older. This longitudinal finding is consistent with a cross-sectional pattern noted recently by Nicole E. Henniger and Christine R. Harris, and with the theory of socioemotional regulation suggested by scholars such as Laura L. Carstensen. Second, using fixed-effects equations and prospective analysis, the analysis reveals that envy today is a powerful predictor of worse SF-36 mental health and well-being in the future. A change from the lowest to the highest level of envy, for example, is associated with a worsening of SF-36 mental health by approximately half a standard deviation (p <0.001). Third, no evidence is found for the idea that envy acts as a useful motivator. Greater envy is associated with slower -- not higher -- growth of psychological well-being in the future. Nor is envy a predictor of later economic success. Fourth, the longitudinal decline of envy leaves unaltered a U-shaped age pattern of well-being from age 20 to age 70. These results are consistent with the idea that society should be concerned about institutions that stimulate large-scale envy.

Falling Behind and Catching up: India’s Transition from a Colonial Economy

355/2018 Bishnupriya Gupta

At midnight of 15th August 1947, India became an independent country. It ended 200 years of colonial rule under the British Empire. It altered the borders of India. Two distinct regions from the Western and the Eastern sides were carved out as a separate political entity of the state of Pakistan.2 Indian independence also led to a major change in the direction of economic policy. From a globalized economy integrated into the British Empire, the next 30 years saw a retreat from policies of free trade and capital flows. The newly independent state embraced the idea of development through industrialization. In an economy, where capital was scarce and entrepreneurship was concentrated in a few communities, the state stepped in to fill the gap. India was not unusual in this. Many parts of the underdeveloped world, both colonies in Asia and independent countries in Latin America moved towards protectionist policies to develop an industrial sector. This was not simply the infant industry argument, which had characterized industrialization in the United States and Europe 19th century. The role of the state in the newly independent countries, in the second half of the 20th century, was developmental and directly interventionist. While the industrialized world in Europe and North America began to rebuild the institutions of free trade after 1945, the underdeveloped world moved in a different direction, where the idea of a “Developmental State” became an intrinsic part of policy making. This paper will take a long run view of Indian economic development. I will start with Mughal India under the emperor Akbar in 1600. This was the high point of economic prosperity measured by average living standards. I will look at the changes in the economy over the next 400 years, first in response to increasing trade with Europe through the global network of European trading companies, then through the formal political rule of the East India Company.

Exposing corruption: Can electoral competition discipline politicians?

311/2016 Farzana Afridi, Amrita Dhillon and Eilon Solan

In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instil norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low. We first build a simple game theoretic model to capture the effect of electoral competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher, and for intermediate levels of competition, corruption is lower. We also predict that when there are different types of corruption, then incumbents increase corruption in the components that voters care less about regardless of competition. We test the model's predictions using data gathered on audit findings of leakages from a large public program in Indian villages belonging to the state of Andhra Pradesh during 2006-10 and on elections to the village council headship in 2006. Our results largely confirm the theoretical results that competition has a non-linear effect on corruption, and that the impact of electoral competition varies by whether theft is from the public or private component of the service delivery. Overall, our results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced.

The Importance of School Systems: Evidence from International Differences in Student Achievement

300/2016 Ludger Woessmann

Students in some countries do far better on international achievement tests than students in other countries. Is this all due to differences in what students bring with them to school – socioeconomic background, cultural factors, and the like? Or do school systems make a difference? This essay argues that differences in features of countries’ school systems, and in particular their institutional structures, account for a substantial part of the cross-country variation in student achievement. It first documents the size and cross-test consistency of international differences in student achievement. Next, it uses the framework of an education production function to provide descriptive analysis of the extent to which different factors of the school system, as well as factors beyond the school system, account for cross-country achievement differences. Finally, it covers research that goes beyond descriptive associations by addressing leading concerns of bias in cross-country analysis. The available evidence suggests that differences in expenditures and class size play a limited role in explaining cross-country achievement differences, but that differences in teacher quality and instruction time do matter. This suggests that what matters is not so much the amount of inputs that school systems are endowed with, but rather how they use them. Correspondingly, international differences in institutional structures of school systems such as external exams, school autonomy, private competition, and tracking have been found to be important sources of international differences in student achievement.

How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of New Deal Spending and Lending Policies in the 1930s

274/2016 Price Fishback

The New Deal during the 1930s was arguably the largest peace-time expansion in federal government activity in American history. Until recently there had been very little quantitative testing of the microeconomic impact of the wide variety of New Deal programs. Over the past decade scholars have developed new panel databases for counties, cities, and states and then used panel data methods on them to examine the examine the impact of New Deal spending and lending policies for the major New Deal programs. In most cases the identification of the effect comes from changes across time within the same geographic location after controlling for national shocks to the economy. Many of the studies also use instrumental variable methods to control for endogeneity. The studies find that public works and relief spending had state income multipliers of around one, increased consumption activity, attracted internal migration, reduced crime rates, and lowered several types of mortality. The farm programs typically aided large farm owners but eliminated opportunities for share croppers, tenants, and farm workers. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s purchases and refinancing of troubled mortgages staved off drops in housing prices and home ownership rates at relatively low ex post cost to taxpayers. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s loans to banks and railroads appear to have had little positive impact, although the banks were aided when the RFC took ownership stakes.

Measuring Changes in the Bilateral Technology Gaps between China, India and the U.S. 1979 - 2008

261/2016 Keting Shen, Jing Wang and John Whalley

Popular literature suggests a rapid narrowing of the technology gap between China and the U.S. based on large percentage increases in Chinese patent applications, and equally large increases in college registrants and completed PhDs (especially in sciences) in China in recent years. Little literature attempts to measure the technology gap directly using estimates of country aggregate technologies. This gap is usually thought to be smaller than differences in GDP per capita since the later reflect both differing factor endowments and technology parameters. This paper assesses changes in China’s technology gaps both with the U.S. and India between 1979 and 2008, comparing the technology level of these economies using a CES production framework in which the technology gap is reflected in the change of technology parameters. Our measure is related to but differs from the Malmquist index. We determine the parameter values for country technology by using calibration procedures. Our calculations suggest that the technology gap between China and the U.S. is significantly larger than that between India and the U.S. for the period before 2008. The pairwise gaps between the U.S. and China, and the U.S. and India remain large while narrowing at a slower rate than GDP per worker. Although China has a higher growth rate of total factor productivity than India over the period, the bilateral technology gap between China and India is still in India’s favor. India had higher income per worker than China in the 1970’s, and China’s much more rapid physical and human capital accumulation has allowed China to move ahead, but a bilateral technology gap remains.

The Dynamics of Comparative Advantage

252/2015 Gordon H. Hanson, Nelson Lind and Marc-Andreas Muendler

This paper characterizes the dynamic empirical properties of country export capabilities in order to inform modelling of the long-run behaviour of comparative advantage. The starting point for our analysis is two strong empirical regularities in international trade that have previously been studied incompletely and in isolation to one another. The literature has noted a tendency for countries to concentrate exports in a few sectors. We show that this concentration arises from a heavy-tailed distribution of industry export capabilities that is approximately log normal and whose shape is stable across countries, sectors, and time. Likewise, previous research has detected a tendency for mean reversion in national industry productivities. We establish that mean reversion in export capability, rather than indicative of convergence in productivities or degeneracy in comparative advantage, is instead consistent with a well behaved stochastic growth process that delivers a stationary distribution of country export advantage. In literature on the growth of cities and firms, economists have used stochastic processes to study the determinants of the long-run size distributions. Our contribution is to develop an analogous empirical framework for identifying the parameters that govern the stationary distribution of export capability. The main result of this analysis is that a generalized gamma distribution, which nests many commonly studied distributions, provides a tight fit of the data but log normality offers a reasonable approximation. Importantly, the stochastic process that generates log normality can be estimated in its discretized form by simple linear regression. Log linearity allows for an extension of our approach to multivariate diffusions, in which one can permit innovations to productivity to be transmitted intersectorally and internationally, as in recent models of trade and growth.

If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour : Managing Threats to State Security in Lithuania under Soviet Rule

247/2015 Mark Harrison

In Soviet Lithuania (and elsewhere) from the 1950s to the 1980s, the KGB applied a form of "zero-tolerance" policing, or profilaktika, to incipient threats to state security. Petty deviation from socio-political norms was regarded as a person's first step towards more serious state crimes, and as a bad example for others. As long as petty violators could be classed as confused or misled rather than motivated by anti-Soviet conviction, their mistakes would be corrected by a KGB warning or "preventive discussion." Successful prevention avoided the costly removal of the subject from society. This represented a complete contrast to the Stalin years, when prevention relied largely on eliminating the subject from society. Preventive discussions were widely practised in many different circumstances. KGB internal evaluations concluded that these discussions were extremely effective in preventing further violations. This was the front line of the Soviet police state; it was perhaps the largest programme for personally targeted behaviour modification anywhere in the world at that time outside the education sector. It was also a front line of the Cold War because the foreign adversary was seen as the most important source of misleading or confusing influence. My work in progress aims to understand the origins and operation of profilaktika, including how and to whom it was applied, how it worked on the individual subject, and its wider influence on the Soviet Union’s social and political order.

The wages of women in England,1260-1850

215/2015 Jane Humphries and Jacob Weisdorf

This paper presents two wage series for unskilled English women workers from 1260 to 1850, the first based on daily wages and the second on the remuneration per day implied in annual service contracts. These two series are compared and the series for women’s daily wages is also compared with evidence for men, revealing interesting trends in the gender gap. These comparisons inform several recent debates: first whether or not “the golden age of the English peasantry” included women; and, second whether or not protoindustrialization and early industrialization provided women with greater opportunities. Our contributions to these debates have implications for wider analyses of growth and wellbeing. For example, historians have argued that the rise in wages that followed the Black Death enticed female servants to delay marriage so contributing to a European Marriage Pattern, a demographic regime believed to enable modern economic growth. However, our findings suggest that servants did not benefit much in the post-plague era and so offers little in support of a ‘girl-powered’ economic breakthrough in England. Similarly, historians have hypothesized that high wages in the eighteenth century explain the labour-saving technological changes which kick-started the industrial revolution and, recently, that women shared in these high wages. Again our findings suggest a less rosy scenario with women who were unable to commit to full-time work losing ground relative to men and to their less constrained peers; such women fell increasingly adrift from any High Wage Economy.

Online fundraising - the perfect ask?

194/2014 Abigail Payne, Kimberley Scharf and Sarah Smith

Online platforms provide an opportunity for individuals to fundraise for their favourite charities and charitable causes. In recent years, individual charity fundraising through these platforms has become a mass activity. Using JustGiving, the UK’s biggest charity fundraising platform, 21 million people have raised £1.5 billion for over 13,000 charities and causes since the website was set up in 2001.Recent figures suggest that online donations are still a relatively small part of overall giving; an estimated 7% of the total dollar amount given in the US and used by 7% of UK donors. But online and text giving are growing at a faster rate than total donations, indicating that this share will grow. In this paper, we present insights on individual fundraising from micro-econometric analysis of JustGiving data. The analysis exploits a number of different data sub-samples. The largest comprises 416,313 fundraisers who were active JustGiving users at the time of an online survey that ran from October 2010 – April 2011. We also analyse data on 10,597 fundraisers who ran in the 2010 London marathon and from a sample of 39,238 fundraisers who had linked their fundraising pages to their Facebook page. Details on all these samples are given in the Appendix. The focus of the analysis is what determines fundraising success. The "perfect ask" in the title of the paper suggests that there may be a winning formula that could easily be replicated. In practice, much of the power of individual fundraising comes from its very personal – and idiosyncratic – nature, but there may nevertheless be some useful lessons to be learned from studying how fundraisers and donors behave. A "typical" fundraising page (the median) has 14 donations and raises £245. But, as shown in Table 1, there is substantial variation in the number of donations and the amounts raised. The top 10% of pages raise £1,343 or more; the bottom 10% manage less than £38. In this paper, we show that at least some of this variation can be linked to specific factors having to do with the individual’s fundraising strategy (for example, the type of event they do and whether or not they set a fundraising target). We also show that social interactions are crucially important – whether between the fundraiser and donors or between donors. Individual fundraising is a uniquely personal and interactive form of fundraising, introducing new social dynamics into fundraising.

Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries

Christopher Woodruff, The CAGE-Chatham House Series, No. 7, July 2013

Low- and lower-middle-income countries typically have a large informal sector, very high self-employment rates and low levels of tax collection. A recent project in Sri Lanka to induce small firms in the informal sector to register did little to change the trajectory of most, but registration did help some firms generate rapid growth – an outcome with important policy implications. For governments in developing countries, getting firms to register should not be simply a cost-benefit calculation involving a trade-off between enforcement costs and tax collection. Registration can also improve the attitude of small business owners towards the state and, more importantly, help stimulate economic growth. The tendency of small firms to remain in the informal sector may have an even more pervasive detrimental impact on growth than one might expect. Their informal status usually allows them to avoid taxes by keeping costs and revenues off the books. However, the lack of information arising from production costs, and the basic accounting systems on which they rely, mean many costly errors in pricing can be made, resulting in considerable lost business. Focusing on avoiding taxes in the informal sector can often distract firms’ attention away from important growth opportunities. Although taxes may discourage some economic activity, the problem in low-income countries is typically lack of capacity and under-enforcement, rather than over-taxation.

Africa's Growth Prospects in a European Mirror: A Historical Perspective

Stephen Broadberry and Leigh Gardner, The CAGE-Chatham House Series, No. 5, February 2013

The relatively rapid growth rates achieved by many African countries in the last decade have raised hopes that the continent is finally on a path to economic convergence with Asia and Latin America, but history suggests that such optimism could be misplaced. Previous periods of rapid growth across Africa have often been followed by phases of economic decline which have erased many of the gains countries have achieved in per capita income. The continent's transition to modern economic growth will thus require a break in the boom-and-bust pattern which has characterized its economic performance during much of the 20th century. European experience since the Middle Ages suggests that the pattern of growth based on increasing demand for export staples, followed by economic reversals, has often resulted in limited overall gains in per capita income. This pattern was only broken following the introduction of significant institutional change. Placing Africa's recent economic performance in a wider historical perspective highlights the fact that the continent's level of per capita income is comparable to pre-industrial Europe and that the institutional changes needed to ensure sustained economic growth have yet to take place. Growth reversals remain a serious threat to Africa's future prosperity, and therefore it is incumbent on policy-makers to focus a great deal more on the introduction of measures that can encourage the development of a robust civil society.

Tax Competition and the Myth of the 'Race-to-the-Bottom': Why Governments Still Tax Capital

Vera Troeger, The CAGE-Chatham House Series, No. 4, February 2013

The majority of OECD countries have only experienced minor effects of capital market integration and capital tax competition since the mid-1980s. There have undoubtedly been some winners, mainly capital owners in larger liberal market economies, and some losers, especially large continental European welfare states. Not only have the dire predictions of the early doom theories not materialized; they have failed. Therefore, there is much to be gained in making the key assumptions underlying traditional tax competition models much more realistic, particularly in terms of predicting the impact of globalization on Western democracies. Tax competition affects countries differently and does not lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ since capital remains incompletely mobile. The competitiveness of a country determines fiscal adjustment strategies by others. Cutting capital taxes, therefore, will not necessarily generate more capital inflows. Tax competition and taxation have broader implications for the fiscal responses of countries to globalization and their redistribution efforts. Given that tax competition affects countries differently, governments will choose diverse strategies to cope with these international pressures. Competition will more negatively affect income inequality in countries that predominantly redistribute via the tax system than in those that historically set up a welfare state by redistributing via social transfers.

Individual and Societal Wisdom: Explaining the Paradox of Human Aging and High Well-Being

191/2014 Dilip V. Jeste and Andrew J. Oswald

Objective: Although human aging is characterized by loss of fertility and progressive decline in physical abilities, later life is associated with better psychological health and well-being. Furthermore, there has been an unprecedented increase in average lifespan over the past century without corresponding extensions of fertile and healthy age spans. We propose a possible explanation for these paradoxical phenomena. Method: We reviewed the relevant literature on aging, well-being, and wisdom. Results: An increase in specific components of individual wisdom in later life may make up for the loss of fertility as well as declining physical health. However, current data on the relationship between aging and individual wisdom are not consistent, and do not explain increased longevity in the general population during the past century. We propose that greater societal wisdom (including compassion) may account for the notable increase in average lifespan over the last century. Data in older adults with serious mental illnesses are limited, but suggest that many of them too experience improved psychosocial functioning, although their longevity has not yet increased, suggesting persistent stigma against mental illness and inadequate societal compassion. Conclusions: Research should focus on the reasons for discrepant findings related to age-associated changes in different components of individual wisdom; also, more work is needed on the construct of societal wisdom. Studies of wisdom and well-being are warranted in older people with serious mental illnesses, along with campaigns to enhance societal compassion for these disenfranchised individuals. Finally, effective interventions to enhance wisdom need to be developed and tested.

Overcoming Moral Hazard with Social Networks in the Worksplace: An Experimental Approach

183/2014 Amrita Dhillon, Ronald Peeters and Ayse Muge Yuksel

The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a lab experiment that suggests quite strongly that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. We capture moral hazard with a dictator game between the referrer and worker. The worker chooses how much to return under different settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using Facebook friendship information gleaned anonymously from subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with different degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring relatively more when they know that the referrer has access to friends, and are willing to delegate more often when the social proximity between referrer and worker is potentially higher. In keeping with this expectation, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these results.

Occupational Structure in the Czech Lands Under the Second Serfdom

176/2013 Alexander Klein and Sheilagh Ogilvie

A shift in occupational structure towards non-agricultural activities is widely viewed as a key component of European economic growth during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’. Yet little is known about this process in those parts of eastern-central Europe that experienced the early modern ‘second serfdom’, the massive increase in the institutional powers of landlords over the rural population. We analyse non-agricultural occupations under the second serfdom using data on 6,983 Bohemian villages in 1654. Bohemia resembled other eastern-central, Nordic and southern European economies in having a lower percentage of non-agricultural activities than western Europe. But Bohemian serfs engaged in a wide array of industrial and commercial activities whose intensity varied significantly with village characteristics. Non-agricultural activity showed a significant positive relationship with village size, pastoral agriculture, sub-peasant social strata, Jews, freemen, female household heads, and village mills, and a significant negative relationship with arable agriculture and urban agglomerations. Non-agricultural activity was also positively associated with landlord presence in the village, although the relationship turned negative at higher values and landlord presence reversed the positive effects of female headship and mills. Under the second serfdom, landlords encouraged serf activities from which they could extort rents, while stifling others which threatened their interests.

Accounting for the Great Divergence

160/2013 Stephen Broadberry

This paper “accounts” for the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia in two ways. In the sense of measurement: (1) the traditional view, in which the Great Divergence had late medieval origins and was already well under way during the early modern period, is confirmed (2) However, revisionists are correct to point to regional variation within both continents (3) There was a Little Divergence within Europe, with a reversal of fortunes between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe. (4) There was a Little Divergence within Asia, with Japan overtaking China and India. However, Japan started at a lower level of per capita income than the North Sea Area and grew at a slower rate, so continued to fall behind until after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Any explanation needs to be able to account for the Little Divergences within Europe and Asia as well as the Great Divergence between the two continents. The divergences arose from the differential impact of shocks hitting economies with different structural features. The structural factors include: (1) The large share of pastoral farming in agriculture which helped to put the North Sea Area on the path to high-value-added, capital-intensive, non-human-energy intensive production. (2) Late marriage in the North Sea Area, which lowered fertility and encouraged human capital formation (3) Labour supply, with an industrious revolution helping to explain the Little Divergences within both Asia and Europe (4) Institutions, with the role of the state helping to explain the success of the North Sea Area. The two key shocks were (1) The Black Death, which led to a permanent per capita income gain in the North Sea Area, but not in the rest of Eurasia (2) The new trade routes which opened up from Europe to Asia and the Americas around 1500.

China and India: Reforms and the Response: How Differently have the Economies Behaved

129/2013 Manmohan Agarwal and John Whalley

The relative performance of China and India is compared using two different methods and they provide a very different picture of their relative performance. We compare the average absolute values of indictors for the decade of the 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. We use indicators such as the current account balance (CAB), exports of goods and services (XGS), foreign direct investment inflow (FDI), gross domestic savings, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), aid, private capital inflows (PrK) and workers’ remittances, all as a percentage of GDP. We also look at the growth rate of per capita GDP, exports of goods and services and of gross fixed capital formation. Using a two tailed- test we find that China does better than India for most of these indicators. For instance, China has a higher growth rate of per capita income, XGS and GFCF as also a higher share of XGS, GFCF etc in GDP than does India. We also find that China usually has a lower CV, namely a more stable performance. But over the three decades the CV falls in India so it is approaching that in China, namely the two economies are becoming more similar. We also compare the dynamic performance of the two economies since their reforms. We form index numbers for the indicators. So for example, we from an index number for share of exports in GDP with year 1 of reform in China being 100, i.e. the index for the share in 1979 is 100. Year 2 would be the index number for 1980, namely the value of the share in 1980 with the share in 1979 being 100, etc. In the case of India year 1 would be 1992 once the reforms started, year 2 would be 1993 and so on, so the index would have 1992 as the base year. We find that the indices behave very similarly in the two economies for many of the indicators, namely the pattern of change in China after 1979 is the same as in India after 1992.

The 1991 Reforms, Indian Economic Growth

128/2013 Manmohan Agarwal and John Whalley

This paper analyses the effects of the reforms initiated in India following the balance of payments (BOP) crisis of 1991 on economic performance. We do not find persuasive the contention of many analysts that growth accelerated after the mid-1980s when reforms were initiated. Nor does statistical analysis support the contention that reforms in the mid-1980s resulted in a growth acceleration. We show that there is an accelerating rate of growth of GDP after the mid 1970s and it is difficult to relate this gradual acceleration to specific policy changes. The changed policies in the 1980s did not mean a basic change in the policy framework. Furthermore, since corporate investment as a share of GDP did not increase in the 1980s it is difficult to identify the mechanism by which the more pro-business policies of the government were translated to higher growth as claimed by Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005).We show that increasing exports of goods, non-factor services, and labour services, through remittances, played an important role in growth in India. Furthermore, the share of exports of goods and services grew as rapidly in India as in China, so that it cannot be said that growth in India was based more on domestic demand. The increased value of exports of manufactures was important as their value grew from about 16 percent of the manufacturing sector’s value added in the early 1980s to about 60 percent currently. Also, there is no significant difference between the growth rates of value-added in the manufacturing and services sectors except for the period of the Ninth Plan (1997-2001).We find that most of 12 economic indicators show improved performance in the decade 2001-10 compared to the earlier decade 1981-1990. The better performance consisted both in the level and lower variability. Furthermore, we find that the reforms had a gradual effect; the change in the period 1992-2000 was smaller and statistically less significant. We also find that the differences with East Asia and particularly China depend on the basis of the comparison. We compare changes in performance since the reforms, which started in China in 1979 and in India in 1991. Such a comparison shows more similarities than differences. We finally examine social progress. We find that South Asia lags behind other regions in making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and India lags behind other South Asian countries. The responsiveness of the improvement in the MDGs to increases in per capita income is usually low in Asia and particularly in India.

Land Acquisition and Compensation in Singur: What Really Happened?

121/2013 Maitreesh Ghatak, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee and Anusha Nath

This paper reports results of a household survey in Singur, West Bengal concerning compensation offered by the state government to owners of land acquired to make way for a car factory. While on average compensations o.ered were close to the reported market valuations of land, owners of high grade multi-cropped (Sona) lands were undercompensated, which balanced over-compensation of low grade mono-cropped (Sali) lands. This occurred owing to misclassification of most Sona land as Sali land in the official land records. Under-compensation relative to market values significantly raised the chance of compensation offers being rejected by owners. There is considerable evidence of the role of financial considerations in rejection decisions. Land acquisition significantly reduced incomes of owner cultivator and tenant households, despite their efforts to increase incomes from other sources. Agricultural workers were more adversely affected relative to non-agricultural workers, while the average impact on workers as a whole was insignificant. Adverse wealth effects associated with under-compensation significantly lowered household accumulation of consumer durables, while effects on other assets were not perceptible. Most households expressed preferences for non-cash forms of compensation, with diverse preferences across different forms of non-cash compensation depending on occupation and time preferences.

War and Inquisition: Repression in Early Modern Spain

119/2013 Jordi Vidal-Robert

The Spanish Inquisition (1478-1834) lasted for more than three centuries and conducted more than 100,000 trials. Why would the Spanish Crown adopt this type of repressive institution? What were the actual motives of its activity? This paper explores the role of the Spanish Inquisition as a repressive tool of the Spanish Crown. When the Crown had to move military resources abroad to fight a war, the likelihood of an internal revolt against the Crown increased. To minimize the threat of rebellion, the Crown would use the Inquisition to increase repression (trials) in Spain. In a theoretical framework, I show that while the Inquisition would conduct more trials the higher the intensity of the wars fought abroad, it would however decrease its level of repression (trials) if the likelihood of an internal revolt were large enough. This behavior indicates an inverse-U relationship between inquisitorial and war intensity. To test this prediction, I assemble time series data for seven Spanish inquisitorial districts on annual trials of the Inquisition and wars conducted by the Spanish Crown between 1478 and 1808. I show that there is an inverse-U relationship between wars and inquisitorial activity. My results are robust to the inclusion of data on the severity of the weather (droughts) and to adjustments for spillover e.ects from districts other than the main district under analysis. Moreover, using a new database of 35,000 trials of the Inquisition, I show that religious persecution was especially significant during early stages of the Inquisition, while repressive motives better explain its behavior in later periods.

From Divergence to Convergence: Re-evaluating the History Behind China’s Economic Boom

117/2013 Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski

China’s long-term economic dynamics pose a formidable challenge to economic historians. The Qing Empire (1644-1911), the world’s largest national economy before 1800, experienced a tripling of population during the 17th and 18th centuries with no signs of diminishing per capita income. While the timing remains in dispute, a vast gap emerged between newly rich industrial nations and China’s lagging economy in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Only with an unprecedented growth spurt beginning in the late 1970s did this great divergence separating China from the global leaders substantially diminish, allowing China to regain its former standing among the world’s largest economies. This essay develops an integrated framework for understanding that entire history, including both the divergence and the recent convergent trend. We explain how deeply embedded political and economic institutions that contributed to a long process of extensive growth before 1800 subsequently prevented China from capturing the benefits associated with the Industrial Revolution. During the 20th century, the gradual erosion of these historic constraints and of new obstacles erected by socialist planning eventually opened the door to China’s current boom. Our analysis links China’s recent development to important elements of its past, while using recent success to provide fresh perspectives on the critical obstacles undermining earlier modernization efforts, and their eventual removal.

What are we learning from business training and entrepreneurship evaluations

116/2013 David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff

Business training programs are a popular policy option to try to improve the performance of enterprises around the world. The last few years have seen rapid growth in the number of evaluations of these programs in developing countries. We undertake a critical review of these studies with the goal of synthesizing the emerging lessons and understanding the limitations of the existing research and the areas in which more work is needed. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the length, content, and types of firms participating in the training programs evaluated. Many evaluations suffer from low statistical power, measure impacts only within a year of training, and experience problems with survey attrition and measurement of firm profits and revenues. Over these short time horizons, there are relatively modest impacts of training on survivorship of existing firms, but stronger evidence that training programs help prospective owners launch new businesses more quickly. Most studies find that existing firm owners implement some of the practices taught in training, but the magnitudes of these improvements in practices are often relatively modest. Few studies find significant impacts on profits or sales, although a couple of the studies with more statistical power have done so. Some studies have also found benefits to microfinance organizations of offering training. To date there is little evidence to help guide policymakers as to whether any impacts found come from trained firms competing away sales from other businesses versus through productivity improvements, and little evidence to guide the development of the provision of training at market prices. We conclude by summarizing some directions and key questions for future studies.

Unfavorable Land Endowment, Cooperation, and Reversal of Fortune

114/2013 Anastasia Litina

This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic development can be traced to the effect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavourable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse effect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the beneficial effects of cooperation on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries lagged behind during the agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent effect on social capital, have become increasingly important in the process of industrialization, the transition from agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited, permitting those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across countries the research further explores the testable predictions of the theory. It establishes that: (i) reversal of fortunes in the process of development can be traced to variation in natural land productivity across countries. Economies characterized by favourable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage of development but were overtaken in the process of industrialization; (ii) lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital; (iii) cooperation, as reflected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive and collective action could have diminished the adverse effects of the environment and enhance agricultural output.

Estimating the influence of life satisfaction and positive affect on later income using sibling fixed-effects

100/2012 Jan-Emmanuel De Neve and Andrew J. Oswald

The question of whether there is a connection between income and psychological well-being is a long-studied issue across the social, psychological, and behavioural sciences. Much research has found that richer people tend to be happier. However, relatively little attention has been paid to whether happier individuals perform better financially in the first place. This possibility of reverse causality is arguably understudied. Using data from a large US representative panel we show that adolescents and young adults who report higher life satisfaction or positive affect grow up to earn significantly higher levels of income later in life. We focus on earnings approximately one decade after the person’s well-being is measured; we exploit the availability of sibling clusters to introduce family fixed-effects; we account for the human capacity to imagine later socio-economic outcomes and to anticipate the resulting feelings in current wellbeing. The study’s results are robust to the inclusion of controls such as education, IQ, physical health, height, self-esteem, and later happiness. We consider how psychological well-being may influence income. Sobel-Goodman mediation tests reveal direct and indirect effects that carry the influence from happiness to income. Significant mediating pathways include a higher probability of obtaining a college degree, getting hired and promoted, having higher degrees of optimism and extraversion, and less neuroticism.

Business Training and Female Enterprise Start-up, Growth, and Dynamics: Experimental evidence from Sri Lanka

98/2012 Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie, Christopher Woodruff

We conduct a randomized experiment among women in urban Sri Lanka to measure the impact of the most commonly used business training course in developing countries, the Start-and-Improve Your Business (SIYB) program. We work with two representative groups of women: a random sample of women operating subsistence enterprises and a random sample of women who are out of the labour force but interested in starting a business. We track impacts of two treatments – training only and training plus a cash grant – over two years with four follow-up surveys and find that the short- and medium-term impacts differ. For women already in business, training alone leads to some changes in business practices but has no impact on business profits, sales or capital stock. In contrast the combination of training and a grant leads to large and significant improvements in business profitability in the first eight months, but this impact dissipates in the second year. For women interested in starting enterprises, we find that business training speeds up entry but leads to no increase in net business ownership by our final survey round. Both profitability and business practices of the new entrants are increased by training, suggesting training may be more effective for new owners than for existing businesses. We also find that the two treatments have selection effects, leading to entrants being less analytically skilled and poorer.

Expanding School Resources and Increasing Time on Task: Effects of a Policy Experiment in Israel on Student Academic Achievement and Behavior

95/2012 Victor Lavy

In this paper, I examine how student academic achievements and behaviour were affected by a school finance policy experiment undertaken in elementary schools in Israel. Begun in 2004, the funding formula changed from a budget set per class to a budget set per student, with more weight given to students from lower socioeconomic and lower educational backgrounds. The experiment altered teaching budgets, the length of the school week, and the allocation of time devoted to core subjects. The results suggest that spending more money and spending more time at school and on key tasks all lead to increasing academic achievements with no behavioural costs. I find that the overall budget per class has positive and significant effects on students' average test scores and that this effect is symmetric and identical for schools that gained or lost resources due to the funding reform. Separate estimations of the effect of increasing the length of the school week and the subject-specific instructional time per week also show positive and significant effects on math, science, and English test scores. However, no cross effects of additional instructional time across subjects emerge, suggesting that the effect of overall weekly school instruction time on test scores reflects only the effect of additional instructional time in these particular subjects. As a robustness check of the validity of the identification strategy, I also use an alternative method that exploits variation in the instruction time of different subjects. Remarkably, this alternative identification strategy yields almost identical results to the results obtained based on the school funding reform. Additional results suggest that the effect on test scores is similar for boys and girls but it is much larger for pupils from low socioeconomic backgrounds and it is also more pronounced in schools populated with students from homogenous socioeconomic backgrounds. The evidence also shows that a longer school week increases the time that students spend on homework without reducing social and school satisfaction and without increasing school violence.

Strategic Budgeteering and Debt Allocation

85/2012 Christina J. Schneider and Vera E. Troeger

This paper analyses how opportunistic governments choose between alternative fiscal policies in order to increases their chances of re-election. To increase the provision of public goods shortly before elections – and thus, to generate a fiscal political business cycles – governments may either increase deficits or redistribute governmental resources from long-term efficient sources to short-term efficient public programs. We argue that incumbents who face highly competed elections principally have an incentive to spend more on public goods even though these investments are not efficient in the long term. In principal, they would do so by increasing the deficits (with re-balancing the budget after the election). However, our model demonstrates that incumbents would even electioneer at the cost of long-term investments if the extent of fiscal transparency does not allow them to finance the provision of public goods with higher deficits. In other words, if elections are close and voters may observe the governmental deficit, then governments tend to increase the provision of public goods – and consequently, their electoral prospects – by a redistribution of budget resources from long-term efficient investment to a short-term provision of public goods. We test the predictions with new data on the composition of government consumption for 17 OECD countries over 35 years. The preliminary findings suggest that governments indeed reshuffle resources from long-term efficient investment to short-term public goods before elections especially if elections are contested.

De Facto Capital Mobility, Equality, and Tax Policy in Open Economies

84/2012 Vera E. Troeger

This paper attempts at giving theoretical and empirical answers to the remaining puzzles in the literature on tax competition: the persistently high tax rates on mobile capital and the large variation in domestic tax systems. I argue that governments face a political trilemma, in which they cannot maintain the politically optimal level of public good provision, reduce capital taxes to competitive levels and implement a political support-maximizing mix of tax rates on capital and labour simultaneously. In particular, while legal restriction on capital flows have been eliminated by virtually all OECD countries, de facto capital mobility falls short of being perfect. Limits to full capital mobility result from ownership structures: the higher the concentration of capital, the higher the de facto mobility of capital and the lower the equilibrium tax rate. Second, the demand for the provision of public goods further constraints governments’ choices of the capital tax rate. If revenue from taxation of mobile factors declines, politicians cannot necessarily cut back spending without losing political support. Policy makers, accordingly, do not face a simple optimization problem when deciding on capital taxation. Rather, they have to choose a tax system which allows them to supply an appropriate level of public goods. Policy makers finally face a trade-off resulting from the redistributive conflict between capital-owners and workers. This conflict does not resemble a mere zero-sum game, because lower levels of capital taxation are likely to improve aggregate welfare, but the decision on capital taxation also cannot be analysed in isolation from the distributive effects of reducing taxes on mobile factors. This political logic of tax competition generates important predictions which are tested empirically for 23 OECD countries over 30 years within a spatial econometrics framework.

Smithian Growth Through Creative Organisation

77/2012 Patrick Legros, Andrew F. Newman and Eugenio Proto

We consider a model in which appropriate organization fosters innovation, but because of contractibility problems, this benefit cannot be internalized. The organizational design element we focus on is the division of labor, which as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by observers of the production process. However, entrepreneurs choose its level only to facilitate monitoring their workers. Whether there is innovation depends on the interaction of the markets for labour and for inventions. A high level of specialization is chosen when the wage share is low. But low wage shares arise only when there are few entrepreneurs, which limits the market for innovations therefore and discourages inventive activity. When there are many entrepreneurs, the innovation market is large, but the rate of invention is low because there is little specialization. Rapid technological progress therefore requires a balance between these opposing effects, which occurs with a moderate relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers. In a dynamic version of the model in which a credit constraint limits entry into entrepreneurship, this relative scarcity depends on the wealth distribution, which evolves endogenously. There is an inverted-U relation between growth rates driven by innovation and the level of inequality. Institutional improvements have ambiguous effects on growth. In light of the model, we offer a reassessment of the mechanism by which organizational innovations such as the factory may have spawned the industrial revolution.

The Growth of Bilateralism

12/2010 Scott L Baier, Jeffery H Bergstrand and Roland Mariutto

One of the most notable international economic events over the past 20 years has been the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Bilateral agreements account for 80 percent of all agreements notified to the WTO, 94 percent of those signed or under negotiation, and currently 100 percent of those at the proposal stage. Some have argued that the growth of bilateralism is attributable to governments having pursued a policy of "competitive liberalisation" - implementing bilateral FTAs to offset potential trade diversion caused by FTAs of "third-country-pairs" - but the growth of bilateralism can also be attributed potentially to "tariff complementarity" - the incentive for FTA members to reduce their external tariffs on non-members. Guided by new comparative statics from the numerical general equilibrium monopolistic competition model of FTA economic determinants in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), we augment their parsimonious logit (and probit) model of the economic determinants of bilateral FTAs to incorporate theory-motivated indexes to examine the influence of existing memberships on subsequent FTA formations. The model can predict correctly 90 percent of the bilateral FTAs within five years of their formation, while still predicting "No-FTA" correctly in 90 percent of the observations when no FTA exists, using a sample of over 350,000 observations for pairings of 146 countries from 1960-2005. Even imposing the higher correct prediction rate of "No- FTA" of 97 percent in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), the parsimonious model still predicts correctly 75 percent of these rare FTA events; only 3 percent of the observations reflect a country-pair having an FTA in any year. The results suggest that - while evidence supports that "competitive liberalisation" is a force for bilateralism - the effect on the likelihood a pair of countries forming an FTA of the pair's own FTAs with other countries (i.e., tariff complementarity) is likely just as important as the effect of third-country-pairs' FTAs (i.e., competitive liberalisation) for the growth of bilateralism.