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Microeconomic Theory

Microeconomic Theory

The Department of Economics at the University of Warwick has an active Microeconomic Theory Research Group, with a weekly external seminar, a weekly internal workshop, and high quality PhD students. We also organise international conferences on campus, or in Venice.

Our activities

CRETA Seminars in Economic Theory

Wednesday: 4-5.30pm
Since its creation in 2006, CRETA has run a seminar series with external and internal talks on economic theory and applications. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below:

Organisers: Daniele Condorelli and Costas Cavounidis

Micro Theory Work in Progress (MIWP) Workshop

Thursday: 1-2pm
For faculty and PhD students at Warwick and other top-level academic institutions across the world. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below.

Organiser: Agustin Troccoli-Moretti

People

Events

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Wed 18 Feb, '26
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CRETA Theory Seminar - Thomas Mariotti
S2.79

Title: Keeping the agents in the dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle (with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Alessandro Pavan).

Abstract: We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a principal's payoff guarantee against her competitors' threats. Second, they can support equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported with standard mechanisms. These results call for a novel approach to competing mechanisms, which we develop to identify a canonical game and a canonical class of equilibria, thereby establishing a new revelation principle for this class of environments.

Thu 19 Feb, '26
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Youngji Sohn (PGR)
S2.79

Title: Too many cooks (together with Hyungmin Park)

Wed 25 Feb, '26
-
CRETA Theory Seminar - to be confirmed
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Thu 26 Feb, '26
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Edward Plumb (LSE)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Wed 4 Mar, '26
-
CRETA Theory Seminar - Daniel Rappoport
S2.79

Title: Signaling with Plausible Deniability joint with Andrew McClellan

This is a new paper so there is no draft yet.

Wed 29 Apr, '26
-
CRETA Theory Seminar - Abreu
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Thu 14 May, '26
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Maryam Saeedi (Carnegie Mellon)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Wed 3 Jun, '26
-
CRETA Theory Seminar - to be advised.
TBA

Title to be advised.

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