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Microeconomic Theory

Microeconomic Theory

The Department of Economics at the University of Warwick has an active Microeconomic Theory Research Group, with a weekly external seminar, a weekly internal workshop, and high quality PhD students. We also organise international conferences on campus, or in Venice.

Our activities

CRETA Seminars in Economic Theory

Wednesday: 4-5.30pm
Since its creation in 2006, CRETA has run a seminar series with external and internal talks on economic theory and applications. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below:

Organisers: Daniele Condorelli and Costas Cavounidis

Micro Theory Work in Progress (MIWP) Workshop

Thursday: 1-2pm
For faculty and PhD students at Warwick and other top-level academic institutions across the world. For a detailed scheduled of speakers please follow the link below.

Organiser: Agustin Troccoli-Moretti

People

Events

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Wed 21 May, '25
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CRETA Seminar - Agathe Pernoud (Chicago)
S2.79

Title: Bundling against Learning

Abstract: A monopolist sells multiple goods to an uninformed buyer. The buyer chooses to learn any one-dimensional signal correlated with their values for the goods, anticipating the seller's mechanism. The seller designs an optimal mechanism, anticipating the buyer's learning choice. In a generalized Gaussian environment, we show that every equilibrium has vertical learning where the buyer's posterior means are co-monotonic, and every equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to nested bundling where the seller offers a menu of nested bundles to screen the buyer.

Wed 28 May, '25
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CRETA Seminar - Yannai Gonczarowski (Harvard)
S0.20
Thu 29 May, '25
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Joe Basford (LSE)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Wed 4 Jun, '25
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CRETA Seminar - Mira Frick (Yale)
S0.20

Title to be advised.

Thu 5 Jun, '25
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MIWP Workshop - Yusufcan Demirkan (KU)
S0.20

Title to be advised

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