472 - Financing Optimal Provision of Public Public Expenditure by Decentralised Agencies
R. Boadway, I. Horiba and R. Jha
It has realized since Pigou (1947) that if public goods are financed by distortionary taxa¬tion, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will exceed the actual resource cost by the marginal deadweight cost of taxation. Atkinson and Stern (1974) formally derived public goods decision rules for an economy financing the public goods using linear taxes. Subsequent work by Browning (1978), Wildasin (1984) and Usher (1986). has expanded our understanding of the way in which distortionary taxes influence the optimal size of the public sector. As the survey by Auerbach (1987) reveals, the direction of subsequent research on the marginal cost of public funds has been manifold, and has admitted, among other things, more complicated production structures, the effects of pre existing taxes, risk, and imperfect information. Recent has analyzed the marginal cost and marginal benefit of public funds when public goods are substitutes/complements to private goods (Mikami (1993)), when equity is an objective of taxation (Wilson (1991), when non-linear taxes are used to finance the public goods (Tuomala (1990), Boadway and Keen (1993)), and during a process of tax reform (Schob (1994))