Maria Vagliasindi and Michael Waterson
The aim of this paper is to consider in some detail the modelling implications of the introduction of regulation in vertically related markets, allowing for non-linear pricing. Laffont and Tirole focus their analysis on socially optimal linear access price regulation under incomplete information, following the Bayesian Nash approach to regulation. By contrast, we leave aside asymmetric information issues, paying particular attention to the problems related to the entrant's behaviour and non-linear pricing. In fact, regarding competitive issues Laffont and Tirole (1990) and (1994) make rather specific assumptions, as competitors are assumed to have an unlimited capacity and they do not really need to undertake any economic decisions. In particular, the price they face is just set equal to the sum of the marginal cost and the access price and they are only allowed to charge linear price schedules. Furthermore, also the authority (as well as the incumbent) makes use only of a linear access pricing policy. After specifying the main assumptions of the proposed games we show how when the incumbent remains the monopolist of an intermediate good (e.g. a network facility) which is consumed both internally and by any potential competitors, with second degree price discrimination, cream skimming turns out to be the only strategy of competition allowed by the incumbent. We also show how the access charge determined by the incumbent depends, apart from the type of network cost function, on the entrant's cost, the game's structure and the strategy of competition chosen by the entrant. Therefore, in this framework the Baumol-Willig rule is optimal only in a very narrow set of circumstances. Finally, we show how the same results derived for a vertically integrated industry still hold under vertical separation when a) perfect discrimination between downstream producers is not forbidden; and/or b) it is possible to resell access rights.
We believe that these and many other extensions of the analysis are helpful in understanding this intriguing field of study, since they not only have a particular relevance from a theoretical perspective, but also bring considerable practical implications for the policy to apply in many relevant utility industries.