Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Natalia Zinovyeva
Co-ordinator
Jennifer Smith
Deputy Co-ordinator
Research Students
Events
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Seminar - Xueying Zhao (PGR)
Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases
Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.