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Applied Microeconomics

Applied Microeconomics

The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.

The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.

Our activities

Work in Progress seminars

Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm

Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.

Applied Econometrics reading group

Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm

Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details

People

Academics

Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:


Natalia Zinovyeva

Co-ordinator

Jennifer Smith

Deputy Co-ordinator


Events

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CRETA Theory Seminar - Marcus Pivato (Cergy Paris)

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Location: S2.79

Title. Weighted representative democracy

Abstract. I will discuss a new system of democratic representation. In this system, any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. In the first part of the talk, I will discuss some joint work with Arnold Soh, in which we show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature will agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote. In the second part of the talk, I will discuss my more recent work on endogenous candidacy in this model (this is work in progress).

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