Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
PEPE Seminar - Erik Wang (NYU)
Title: How (not) to Solve the Guardianship Dilemma: Counterbalancing and the Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China
Abstract: Counterbalancing, a strategy to strengthen control of the military by weakening the command authority within it, is prevalent across many parts of the world. Yet, few studies have systematically examined the benefits and costs of this strategy at the micro-level. We exploit a unique historical setting to evaluate how counterbalancing affects the competence and loyalty of the military. Using geocoded data from archival and archaeological sources, we study a reform in China’s Tang Dynasty (618 - 907 CE) that fragmented the military commissioners’ authority over their armies. Difference-in-differences analyses document that the reform reduced the military’s threat to the regime: commissioner-led rebellions decreased. However, it reduced the military’s effectiveness, evidenced by an increase in soldier-led mutinies within the military, a higher probability of defeat in battles, and an increase in civilian uprisings against the regime. Our findings highlight the sharp tradeoffs of military control in settings with strong military corporate interest.