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Applied Microeconomics

Applied Microeconomics

The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.

The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.

Our activities

Work in Progress seminars

Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm

Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.

Applied Econometrics reading group

Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm

Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details

People

Academics

Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:


Natalia Zinovyeva

Co-ordinator

Jennifer Smith

Deputy Co-ordinator


Events

Wednesday, November 09, 2022

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CAGE-AMES Workshop - Prateek Bhan
S2.79 via MS Teams

Title: DO ROLE MODELS INCREASE STUDENT HOPE AND EFFORT? EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

Abstract:

This paper offers experimental evidence on the significance of role models on fostering hope, increasing effort and improving the academic performance of primary school students in India. Students from private schools in Jaipur were randomised at an individual level to a treatment or a placebo group. Treated students watch a short film produced in Jaipur, as a part of the experiment. The placebo group students watch a television show for kids, ‘Malgudi Days’. This intervention increases student hope by 0.17 standard deviation (s.d.) and effort by 0.26 s.d. Along with hope, I find significant improvements in students’ self-efficacy or optimism and happiness that are sustained in the medium run. While learning outcomes do not change immediately, the one-off treatment leads to a 0.16 s.d. increase on standardised test scores in English, six-weeks after the intervention with no effect on Mathematics. A cost-effectiveness analysis highlights role models as a promising intervention tool that can have an effect on student motivation and their learning outcomes.

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CRETA Seminar - Mark Whitmeyer (ASU)
S2.79

Title:Buying Opinions

 Abstract: A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns (the experiment chosen by the agent) nor what the agent discovers (the realization of the experiment) are contractible, the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent can be induced to acquire and report honestly. When the agent is risk neutral, and a) is not asked to learn too much, b) can acquire information sufficiently cheaply, or c) can face sufficiently large penalties, the principal can attain the first-best outcome. Risk aversion (by the agent) introduces inefficiencies: the first-best is unattainable, though whether the agent obtains rents depends on whether he may exit to take his outside option after learning.

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