Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Thomas Brzustowski (Essex)
Title: Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity (with Albin Erlanson)
We analyze the mechanism-design problem of a principal allocating amounts of a perfectly divisible good to $n$ agents, each of whom desires as much of the good as possible. The principal has an ideal allocation for each agent, which is private information held by that agent. The principal has access to an auditing technology that allows her to perfectly uncover the private information of any $k$ ($<n$) of the agents. We present a tractable approach to solve for the principal's optimal mechanism. Agents may either accept a default amount or make an arbitrarily precise request. Agents submitting precise requests are audited randomly, with penalties for requesting more than their ideal allocation and rewards for requesting less.