Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
Wednesday, November 30, 2022
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CRETA Seminar - Gregorio Curello (Bonn)S2.79Title : Incentives for collective innovation Abstract: Identical agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized improvements in a technology they share. Their payoff flow grows as the technology develops, but so does the opportunity cost of effort, due to a resource trade-off between using and improving the technology. The game admits a unique strongly symmetric equilibrium, and it is Markov; that is, no form of punishment is sustainable. Moreover, in this equilibrium, small innovations may hurt all agents as they severely reduce effort. Allowing each agent to discard the innovations she produces (after observing their size) increases equilibrium effort and welfare. If agents can instead conceal innovations for a period of time, there exists an equilibrium in which improvements are refined in secret until they are sufficiently large, and progress stops after disclosure. Although concealment is inefficient due to forgone benefits and the risk of redundancy, under natural conditions, this equilibrium induces higher welfare than all equilibria with forced disclosure. Weblink: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.01885 |