Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Theory Seminar - Sulagna Dasgupta (Bonn)
Title: Screening Knowledge
A principal (she) tests an agent's (he) knowledge of a subject matter. She has preferences over his unobserved quality, which is correlated with his knowledge. Modeling knowledge as beliefs over an unknown state, I show that optimal tests are simple: They take the form of True-False, weighted True-False or True-False-Unsure, regardless of the principal's preferences, the distribution of the agent's beliefs, its correlation with his quality or his knowledge thereof. The need to elicit knowledge forces the principal to trade-off the efficacy of the test in terms of whom it rewards, against how much it rewards them. The optimal resolution of this trade-off may lead to a partial penalty for an "obvious" answer even if it is correct, a partial reward for a "counterintuitive" answer even if it is incorrect, or a reward for admitting ignorance. When the principal can pick the subject matter, she picks one that admits no such obvious answers. In this case, the highly prevalent True-False test is always optimal, regardless of principal's preferences, agent's learning, or the specific optimal choice of the subject matter.